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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LYNN
FRANKLIN
AVERETT
JACKSON,
Decedent,
MARIA JACKSON,
Appellant.

Case Number 2000486-CA
Priority Number 15

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the discretionary ruling of the trial Court as
provided by Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(h), and by Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial Court correctly rule that the warranty deed executed by Lynn Franklin
Averett Jackson on August 19, 1997, was effectively delivered?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Inasmuch as the factual issues in this case are not in dispute, the Appellate Court
reviews the Conclusions of Law for correctness. Meadowbrook ,LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d
115 (Utah 1998).
Because the facts in this case are not in dispute (Appellant's Brief at pp 5, 13),
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

challenging the trial Court's finding of facts, and marshaling evidence in support of that
challenge are inappropriate. A trial Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES ETC,
There are no statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretations are
determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 19, 1997, the decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, executed a
warranty deed in the presence of the Appellees, his daughters Linda Thomas and Connie
Rowan. The deed conveyed the home of the decedent to Linda Thomas, Connie Rowan and
Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson as tenants in common. The deed was placed into a safety
deposit box after being signed and notarized. The Appellees maintain that though this deed
was never recorded, a valid delivery of the deed occurred when Decedent gave Linda
Thomas a key to the safety deposit box where the deed was kept. Appellant Maria Jackson,
Decedent's wife at the time of his death, maintains that a delivery never occurred, and
therefore Appellant should be entitled to the entirety of Decedent's home. The parties agreed
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to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing and prepared a Pre-Trial Order. The matter was
heard in the probate case before Judge James R. Taylor on April 6, 2000. At the conclusion
of the trial, Judge Taylor ruled in favor of the Appellees. The Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were entered the 4th day of May, 2000. Appellant filed an appeal on
June 5, 2000.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, during his life, owned property in

Utah County, State of Utah, described as follows:
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north from the Southwest
corner of Lot 3 of section 7, Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet; thence South
63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of the beginning. R at 48.
2.

During his life, decedent made an appointment with Richard Coxon, an

attorney at law, and met with Mr. Coxon with his daughters, Linda Thomas and Connie
Rown. R a t 4 7 .
3.

Decedent was advised by Richard Coxon of the differences between a joint

tenancy deed, a tenancy in common deed, and the rights of succession. The decedent
understood the information explained to him by Richard Coxon. R at 47.
4.

Decedent instructed Richard Coxon to prepare a warranty deed which would

convey his interest in the property set forth in the paragraph above to himself and his
daughters, Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan, as tenants in common. R at 47.
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5.

The Deed was executed by decedent knowingly and understanding^ on August

19, 1997 and was notarized the same day. R at 47.
6.

On August 19, 1997, copies of the deed were given to Linda Thomas and

Connie Rowan by decedent, and the original deed was placed in the decedent's safety
deposit box. R at 47. R 59 at p 21.
7.

Approximately one or two months later, decedent gave his daughters access

to the safety deposit box by giving a key to the safety deposit box to Linda Thomas,
decedent's Personal Representative. R 59 at pp 14, 23-28.
8.

The warranty deed was never recorded. R at 39.

9.

On August 30, 1997, decedent Lynn F. Jackson married Maria Cruzado. The

day prior to their marriage the two entered into an Anti-Nuptial Marital Property Agreement.
Rat39, 40.
10.

On January 27, 1998, decedent executed a testamentary document entitled

"Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson," which states in part, "My wife will receive the balance
of my estate."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial Court correctly ruled that by giving Linda Thomas, decedent's Personal
Representative, a key to his safety deposit box during his lifetime, decedent effectively
delivered the warranty deed to the Appellees, effecting an inter-vivos transfer of an
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undivided two-thirds interest in the property to Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan.
Furthermore, Appellant's arguments are based solely on challenges to the trial Court's
Findings of Fact and Appellant has failed to meet the burden of proving error in the Trial
Court's Conclusions of Law concerning the delivery of the deed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTY DEED WAS EFFECTIVELY DELIVERED WHEN THE
DECEDENT GAVE THE GRANTEES ACCESS TO THE DEED.
The substantive issue of law in this case is whether giving a grantee access to the
deed constitutes a valid delivery of the deed.
At the close of the hearing, the Trial Court stated the following:
I find by preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jackson intended to transfer
his property into one-third interests, and that he did— and by executing the
deed in the presence of his daughters, the grantees, and causing copies to be
delivered to them together with giving them access to the safety deposit box
where he specifically showed them the deed would be kept, that he
accomplished delivery. R 59 at page 80 line 21- page 81 line 3.
Though Appellant asserts that the trial Court determined delivery occurred by the "mere
signing of the deed and giving copies of the deed to his daughters," (Appellant's Brief at 19)
the Court's ruling shows that giving "access to the safety deposit box" where the deed was
kept was a key factor in determining delivery.
Appellant cites Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979), to support the position
5
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that a physical delivery of the deed is needed to transfer title. In Wiggill, Lillian Cheney
signed a deed granting ownership in a certain parcel of property to Flora Cheney as grantee.
Lillian Cheney then placed the deed in her safety deposit box. She then instructed the
plaintiff that upon LiUian's death, plaintiff was to go to the bank where he would be granted
access to the safety deposit box. In detennining that no delivery occurred, the Supreme Court
stated, "At all times prior to her death, Lillian Cheney was in possession of the key to the
safety deposit box and had sole and complete control over it. Plaintiff was never given the
key to the safely deposit box." Id at 1351.
In the present case, decedent did not have sole and complete control over the safety
deposit box because decedent gave a key to the box to Linda Thomas.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court concluded in Christensen v. Ogden State Bank,
286 P. 638 (Utah 1930), that intent to pass title can be manifest by issuing a key to. the
deposit box. The Court stated:
If the deceased intended that the title to the savings deposit account should,
during his life, pass to plaintiff, it is difficult to understand why the deceased
did not deliver the key to the safety deposit box to his brother or perform some
other act calculated to make it possible for him to get possession of the
passbook. Id. at 644.
In the present case the trial Court found that the decedent took measures during his lifetime
which pointed to his intent to transfer an undivided two-thirds of his interest in his home to
his two daughters. The statements of the Supreme Court in both Wiggill and Christensen
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support the conclusion of the trial Court that issuing to the grantee a key to the safety deposit
box where the deed was kept constitutes a delivery of the deed.
kiAgrelins v. Mohesky, 494 P.2d 1095 (Kansas 1972), a case which has a similar fact
pattern to the present case. The Kansas Supreme Court stated:
It has been held that delivery is largely a matter of intention, and if the grantor
by words or acts manifests an intention to divest himself of title and vest it in
another, it is sufficient to constitute delivery. At 1101.
and:
Considering the picture as a whole- and the circumstances in their totality—
we believe an intention may reasonably be inferred on the part of the grantors
to effectuate a delivery of the deeds when a key to the lock box was entrusted
to Clair, i d
By entrusting to Linda Thomas a key to the safety deposit box where the deed was
kept, decedent effectively delivered the deed to the Appellees, thus creating an inter-vivos
transfer of an undivided two-thirds interest in decedent's property to Linda Thomas and
Connie Rowan.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
AND HAS NOT SHOWN ANY LEGAL ERROR IN THE COURT'S RULING
Point I of Appellant's argument calls into question the decedent's intent to part with
the possession of the Deed. Point II of Appellant's argument calls into question decedent's
intent when he issued the key to Linda Thomas. And, Point III of Appellant's argument is
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an attempt to marshal evidence in support of the Court's position in regards to the granting
of the key. In each of Appellant's points, Appellant is challenging the Court's Findings of
Fact. Because the facts in this case are not in dispute, challenging the Court's Finding of
Facts is inappropriate.
The Supreme Court provided the following definition of factual issues: "Factual
questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions,
or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as subjective, such as state of
mind." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 at 935 (Utah 1994). Questions as to the decedent's intent
are factual and deference must be given to the trial Court in determining such factual matters.
A trial Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The clearly
erroneous standard is highly deferential to the trial Court's decision. See Pena, 869 P.2d at
936. The trial judge is "considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court
cannot hope to garner from a cold record." Id.
In the present case, the trial Court's Findings of Fact are not clearly erroneous.
Deference must be given to the Court's findings as they pertain to the intent of the decedent
and under what circumstances the Appellee was given a key to the Decedent's safety deposit
box.
Appellant's brief is heavy-laden with factual arguments. Appellant has offered no
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legal argument to support a claim of an error in the trial Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The trial Court correctly concluded that entrusting a key to the safety
deposit box legally constituted delivery. As the moving party, Appellant has not met her
burden of proving legal error.
CONCLUSION
Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, while alive, executed a warranty deed on August 19,
1997, conveying an undivided interest to himself and his two daughters. The deed was
delivered. The delivery of the deed completed the transfer of the property from Lynn
Jackson to himself and his daughters. The property is now owned by the estate of Lynn
Franklin Averett Jackson and his daughters, Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan. Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of the trial judge are not clearly erroneous. The decision of the trial
Court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of March, 2001.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT& ESPLIN

Attorney for Appellee Linda Thomas
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 14th day of March, 2001, two (2)
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to the following:
Michael K. Black
Attorney for Appellant
101 East 200 South
Springville, UT 84663
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(h)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3-4
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a)
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COURT OF APPEALS

78-2a-3

except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2Kb) and redesignated former Subsections
(2Kb) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through
(k).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xh) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act* in
Subsection (4).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995,
substituted "School and Institutional Trust

Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources'* for "Board of State Lands" in Subsection (2Xa).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry,
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d),
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesignated former Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as
(2)(d) to (2Xj).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Decisions of Board of Pardons.
Extraordinary writs.
Final order.
Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
— Sentence reduction.
Cited.
Decisions of Board of Pardons.
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, except when the petition additionally challenges
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v.
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994).

Extraordinary writs.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a
petition for a writ of mandamus directed
against a judge of the district court based on its
authority under this section to enforce compliance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v. Murphv,
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction —
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals —
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction
over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard
v. Murphy, 882 R2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Because, under this section, the Court of
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
Title I. Applicability of Rules
Rule
1. Scope of rules.
2. Suspension of rules.
Title II. Appeals from J u d g m e n t s and Orders of Trial
Courts
3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
6. Bond for costs on appeal.
7. Security: proceedings against sureties.
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal.
9. Docketing statement.
10. Motion for summary disposition.
11. The record on appeal.
12. Transmission of the record.
13. Notice of filing by clerk.
Title III. Review and Enforcement of
Orders of Administrative
Agencies, Commissions,
and Committees
14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; intervention.
15. 16. {Reserved.]
17. Stay pending review.
18. Applicability of other rules to review.
Title IV. Extraordinary Writs; Habeas Corpus
19. Extraordinary writs.
20. Habeas corpus proceedings.
Title V. General Provisions
21. Filing and service.
22. Computation and enlargement of time.
23. Motions.
23A. Motion for reinstatement of appeal.
23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
24. Briefs.
25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem.
26. Filing and service of briefs.
27. Form of briefs.
28. Prehearing conference.
28A. Appellate Mediation Office.
29. Oral argument.
30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of decision.
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument without
written opinion.
32. Interest on judgment.
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
34. Award of costs.
35. Petition for rehearing.
36. Issuance of remittitur.
37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
38. Substitution of parties.
38A Withdrawal of counsel.
39. Duties of the clerk.
40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline.

Title VI. Certification and Transfer Between Courts
Rule
41. Certification of questions of law by United States courts.
42. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of Appeals.
43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court.
44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.
Title VII. Jurisdiction on Writ of Certiorari to Court
of Appeals
45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of court of
appeals.
46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
47. Certification and transmission of record; joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties.
48. Time for petitioning.
49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus curiae.
51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
Forms
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES
Rule 1. Scope of rules.
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the procedure
before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Utah in
all cases. Applicability of these rules to the review of decisions
or orders of administrative agencies is governed by Rule 18.
When these rules provide for a motion or application to be
made in a trial court or an administrative agency, commission,
or board, the procedure for making such motion or application
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice of the
trial court, administrative agency, commission, or board.
(b) Reference to "court.". Except as provided in Rule 43,
when these rules refer to a decision or action by the court, the
reference shall include a panel of the court. The term "trial
court" means the court or administrative agency, commission,
or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken.
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an order of
an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the
state which is inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the
statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall apply
to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals as established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P.
Rule 2. Suspension of rules.
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court,
on its own motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may,
except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48,
suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in
a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in
accordance with its direction. •
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND
ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An

837

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 4

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the
appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within
the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint
notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after
filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court
upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation ofparties. The party taking the appeal shall
be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise
directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application
shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall
designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall
designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal
shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of
each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be
filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served,
the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party
represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice
of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party
taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the
filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall
not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid.
- (g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of
appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice
of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond
required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond
has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt
of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall
be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial
court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title
does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be
added to the title.
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court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
-• J
order appealed
from.
iI
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under
I
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by
I
any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule
4$|
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the
motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for
^
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such
**
motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for
a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall
.-;;
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the
iprescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the
...
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
y
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as
"'
provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed y"
after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but
::
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court
^
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal
ywithin 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
^
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by
'-'.£
paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
"::
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a
£showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
y,
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later '>>•;
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of V?;
the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in
~
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No
^
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10
days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.
-•
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an
inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in
either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is
'•*
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be
shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage
has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in
»
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives
the first notice of appeal.
,
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.

(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an
interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial
to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission
to appeal
an School,
interlocutory
required by Rule Digitized
3 shall by
be the
filed
with W.
theHunter
clerkLaw
of Library,
the trial
Howard
J. Reuben
Clark Law
BYU. order. The appellate court may
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offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that
the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right
so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been
made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is
not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the
action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a
directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is
effective without any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a
party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have
the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to
have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a
directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move
for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If
a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial
or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had
been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the
court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by
determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is
thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds
for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order
thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the
motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the
judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed
unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the
motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the
respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days after
entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: denial of motion. If the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed
on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling
him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes
that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses
the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is entitled to a new trial, or from
directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall
be granted.
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given

Rule 53

orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions
are to be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made
before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its
verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to
the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection.
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may
review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make objections, and they shall be
made out of the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on
the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall,
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one
ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its
findings or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the
question has made in the district court an objection to such
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except
in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
Rule 53. Masters.
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the issues
in an action may be referred by the court to a master upon the
written consent of the parties, or the court may appoint a
master in an action, in accordance with the provisions of
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